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REPEATED GAMES AND
NETWORKS
........................................................................................................
francesco nava
6.1 Introduction
.............................................................................................................................................................................
In many strategic environments, interaction is local and segmented. Competing
neighborhood stores serve different yet overlapping sets of customers; informal lending
and insurance arrangements often have to be fulfilled by relatives and friends; the
behavior of the residents of an apartment block affects their contiguous neighbors to
a larger extent than neighbors in a different block; a nation’s foreign or domestic policy
typically generates larger externalities for neighboring nations than for remote ones.
One classic case is the private provision of local public goods. In addition to local
interaction, one notable feature of these environments is local monitoring: whereas
participants are aware of their own neighbors’ identities and actions, they are not
necessarily aware of the identity and actions of their neighbors’ neighbors. Within these
strategic environments, it is of particular interest to study long-run interaction, when
incentives can only be provided locally in a decentralized manner. The main objective
of this literature is analyzing such interactions within a repeated game framework that
differs from the standard one in that actions can only be observed locally.
Three main lines of research have been developed in such environments. The first,
and most classical, develops Folk Theorems for games with local monitoring, and
establishes that network structure is usually irrelevant for enforcing cooperation when
the frequency of interaction is sufficiently high. The other two explicitly study the link
between network structure and the equilibrium payoffs by focusing on environments
in which discount rates are fixed. One strand analyzes how the monitoring structure
affects the maximal level of equilibrium cooperation, and broadly finds that larger
and/or better connected groups aremore cooperative.The other evaluates how different
communication protocols affect the set of equilibrium payoffs and the incentives to
cooperate in environments with local monitoring.
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106 repeated games and networks
The analysis of community enforcement was initially developed in the context of
repeated games with random matching. Pioneering studies by Kandori () and
Ellison () focused on environments with pairwise matching, and established how
collective punishments could sustain efficient equilibrium outcomes when bilateral
punishments would fail. Subsequent and related contributions on random matching
games include Harrington (), Takahashi (), and Deb (). Although
the matching literature and the literature focusing on stable local interactions (and
therefore on networks) share several methodological insights, there are significant
differences both in the assumptions on feasible interactions and in the broad aims.
Whereas most random matching games assume all players potentially interact, and
thus exchange information about deviant behavior, all network games constrain
interactions, monitoring, and information exchange to take place on a stable network,
which represents the topology of relationships in a society. Whereas most random
matching games (with a few exceptions, including Harrington ) focus on Folk
Theorems and seldom on optimal punishments, the study of network games aims to
establish a relationship between the underlying network structure and the equilibrium
correspondence (or alternatively the most efficient equilibrium payoff).
The chapter begins by presenting relevant definitions in the context of a baseline
environment with local monitoring and local interaction. It proceeds with a survey
of Folk Theorems for network games in Section .. Sections . and . discuss
community enforcement at a given frequency of interaction. In particular, Section
. surveys results on optimal punishments and network structure, while Section
. presents results on communication. Section . hints at related applications (on
reciprocity, informal insurance, and lending), at relevant omissions, and at possible
extensions. Static games with local interactions and the related literature are discussed
in a separate chapter of this book (Chapter ).
6.2 A Baseline Setup
.............................................................................................................................................................................
Environments considered in the literature invoke different assumptions about informa-
tion, matching, and the availability of individual punishments. This section introduces
a baseline environment which nests a large number of possible setups to discuss
contributions more transparently in the following sections.
The Stage Game: Consider a game, the stage game, played by a set N of n players in
which any player i can interact with a subset of players Ni ⊆ N\{i}, which is called the
neighborhood of player i. As customary, assume that j ∈ Ni if and only if i ∈ Nj. This
 Harrington () shows that relationships with low frequencies of interaction can be supported
using relationships that interact more frequently. Takahashi () shows that cooperation can be
sustained in repeated Prisoners’ Dilemmas if all that is observed are partners’ past play. Deb () offers
a general Folk Theorem for anonymous random matching environments.
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francesco nava 107
structure of interaction defines an undirected graph (N,G) in which ij ∈ G if and only
if j ∈Ni. Refer to G as the interaction network. In the stage game players interact with a
possibly random subset of their neighbors. In particular, for any undirected subgraph
G¯⊆ G, let f (G¯|G) denote the probability that the realized network of interactions is G¯.
Let N¯i ⊆Ni denote the realized neighborhood of i in this subgraph. Two extreme cases
are generally considered in the literature. In the first case f (G|G) = , which I refer to
as local interaction, while in the second f (G¯|G) >  implies that ∣∣N¯i∣∣≤ , which I refer
to as pairwise interaction. The former scenario captures environments in which players
interact with all of their neighbors in every period, while the latter environments in
which interactions take place only between pairs of players. Refer to f as the matching
technology.
Assumptions on information vary across setups, but consistently require that players
know their neighborhood, Ni, their realized neighborhood, N¯i, and the matching tech-
nology, f . When players are privately informed about their neighborhood, their beliefs
regarding the interaction network, conditional upon observing their neighborhood, are
derived from a common prior distribution over the set of interaction networks. Beliefs
regarding the realized interaction network are then constructed by simply applying
Bayes’ rule.
The action set of player i is denoted byAi. Given a subsetM of players, letAM denote
×j∈MAj and aM an element of AM . Also, let −i denote the set N\{i}. The stage game
payoffs are common knowledge. The payoff of any player i depends only on actions
chosen in his realized neighborhood, and is denoted by vi(ai,aN¯i |N¯i). As a convention,
the payoff equals zero when N¯i is empty. Payoffs are separable, if for any player i ∈ N
the stage game payoff satisfies
vi(ai,aN¯i |N¯i) =
∑
j∈N¯i uij(ai,aj),
where uij(ai,aj) is the payoff of player i from the relationship ij ∈ G.
The stage game is separable if: (a) payoffs are separable; (b) action sets have the
product structure, Ai = ×j∈NiAij for any i ∈N; and (c) for any action profile aN ∈ AN ,
the stage game payoff on any link ij ∈ G satisfies
uij(ai,aj) = xij(aij,aji),
for some map xij : Aij × Aji → R. In a separable game, players choose actions that
are specific to each interaction, and payoffs in an interaction depend only on actions
chosen in that specific interaction. Any pairwise interaction game can be represented
as a separable game, if the identity of players is known to their realized partners. If so,
action sets have the product structure, as players can tailor behavior to every opponent.
Thus, non-anonymous random matching games are separable. Anonymous random
matching games, instead, are not separable, since action sets do not have the product
structure as players cannot choose a different action for every realized interaction.
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108 repeated games and networks
The stage game is binary-symmetric if: (i) payoffs are separable; (ii) action sets are
binary, Ai = {C,D} for any i ∈N; and (iii) payoffs are symmetric, for any link ij ∈ G,
uij(ai,aj) = ηiju(ai,aj),
for some map u : {C,D} →R and a some scalar ηij ∈R+. In such games, players must
choose the same action in every interaction and cannot discriminate across neighbors.
For convenience, refer to action C as cooperation and action D as defection. Results
on binary-symmetric games are generally developed for stage games in which: (iv) the
payoff u(ai,aj) of player i in an interaction with j satisfies
i \ j C D
C  −l
D + g 
;
(v) mutual cooperation is efficient, g− l< ; and (vi) defection is a best response when
the opponent cooperates g > . The first assumption restricts the class of binary games
by imposing a common payoff for mutual defection across relationships; the second
uniquely pins down an efficient action profile; while the third rules out the trivial case
in which mutual cooperation is an equilibrium of the stage game. Naturally, if l > ,
the stage game has a unique Bayes Nash equilibrium in which all players playD, and all
pairwise interactions amount to a Prisoners’ Dilemma. If instead l < , the stage game
always possesses amixed strategy Bayes Nash equilibrium, and all pairwise interactions
amount to an anti-coordination game.
Local interaction games with separable and symmetric payoffs capture environments
in which behavior cannot be targeted to individual neighbors, while separable games
capture environments inwhich players canmake decisions contingent on the identity of
their realized neighbor. For instance, decentralized competition between sellers, when
prices set are independent of identity of buyers, fits in the class of local interaction games
with separable payoffs; whereas non-anonymous negotiations between traders in an
spatial economy fit in the class of separable games.
Repetition and Local Monitoring: The players play the infinite repetition of the stage
game. The interaction network, G, is realized prior to the beginning of play and
remains fixed throughout the game. Realized interactions, G¯(t), however, are drawn
independently every period, t, from a distribution over the set of subnetworks of G.
Monitoring is local implying that a player observes only the past play in his realized
neighborhood. Local monitoring is a key assumption in the networks approach to
community enforcement as it implies that realized interactions are not anonymous.
 When l< , pure strategy equilibria also exist in some networks, as miscoordinating with neighbors
can be best reply. In particular, if beliefs are concentrated on bipartite graphs (which have only cycles of
even length; Bramoullé ), pure equilibria exist, since all players can successfully miscoordinate their
action with all their neighbors.
 A subnetwork G′ of a networks G is a subset of G. That is, G′ ⊆ G.
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francesco nava 109
This differs from classical random matching models requiring anonymity, as players
may now develop relationship-specific reputations to enforce good behavior. Formally,
when the stage game is not separable, a history hti of length t for player i consists of a
sequence
hti =
{
Ni, N¯i(), a¯i(), N¯i(), ..., a¯i(t− ), N¯i(t)
}
that satisfiesNi ⊆N, N¯i(s) ⊆Ni, and a¯i(s) ∈ ×j∈N¯i(s)∪{i}Aj for any value of s. When the
stage game is separable, however, players monitor only the neighbor-specific actions
played in their realized interactions and therefore a¯i(s) ∈ ×j∈N¯i(s)[Aij × Aji] for any
value of s. Denote by Hti the set of histories of length t for player i, and by Hi the
corresponding set of possible histories, Hi = ∪∞t=Hti . A strategy for player i is a map
that assigns to every history inHi an action in Ai. A full history ht of length t similarly
consists of a sequence
ht = {G, G¯(), a¯(), G¯(), ..., a¯(t− ), G¯(t)}
satisfyingG⊆{ij|i, j∈N}, G¯(s)⊆G, and a¯(s)∈AN . Denote byHt the set of full histories
of length t and by H the set of possible full histories H = ∪∞t=Ht .
Players discount the future by a common factor δ ≤ . To construct the payoffs in the
infinitely repeated game, fix a player i ∈ N and a history hi ∈ Hi, and let hti denote the
subhistory of length t >  of hi. Define
wti
(
hti
)=∑t−s= vi(a(s)|N¯i(s))t
to be the average payoff up to period t and wi
(
hi
)= {wti (hti)}∞t= to be the sequence of
average payoffs. Repeated game payoffs conditional on hi are defined as
Vi(hi) =
{
(− δ)∑∞t= δtvi(a(s)|N¯i(s)) if δ < 
(wi (hi)) if δ = 
where (·) denotes a suitable limit operator, such as the limit inferior or the
Banach-Mazur limit of a sequence.
A full history h uniquely pins down the history of play in the dynamic game. An
observed history hi is associated uniquely with an information set I (hi) for player i
and vice versa. A system of beliefs defines, at each information set I (hi) of player i, the
conditional probability of each full history h ∈ I (hi).
Departures: Although the baseline setup allows for much flexibility, it does not capture
the full range of environments considered in the literature. Some studies model the
 If ∞ denotes the set of bounded sequences of real numbers, a Banach-Mazur limit is a linear
functional  : ∞ → R such that: (i) (e) =  if e = {,, ...}; (ii) (x,x, ...) = (x,x, ...) for any
sequence {xt}∞t= ∈ ∞ (Aliprantis andBorder ). It can be shown that, for any sequence {xt}∞t= ∈ ∞,
liminft→∞ xt ≤ 
({xt}∞t=)≤ limsupt→∞ xt .
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110 repeated games and networks
interaction network as a directed graph. Others allow for global interaction, while
assuming that monitoring is local. If so, players may be affected by the action chosen
by every other player in the game, but only observe the behavior of a subset of players.
Other frameworks have considered imperfect local monitoring by having players only
observe a noisy signal of their neighbors’ actions. Finally, many setups have focused on
communication, by adding to the stage game a communication stage, modelled in one
of many possible ways.
6.3 Limiting Results and Network
Irrelevance
.............................................................................................................................................................................
A significant body of literature provides conditions on the interaction network for a
Folk Theorem to apply. These studies generally establish in many environments that a
Folk Theorem obtains under very weak conditions on the network structure, and thus
yield limited insights about the optimal monitoring structure. A key concern in these
papers is ensuring that players do not cooperate off the equilibriumpath, as grim trigger
strategies may provide such strong incentives to cooperate on the equilibrium path that
players prefer to cooperate even after observing a deviation. Ellison () resolves
this problem by introducing either a public randomization device or a milder version
of grim trigger strategies tailored to make players indifferent between cooperating
and defecting on-path, and then noting that cooperation is more appealing on-path
than off-path (since off-path at least one opponent is already defecting). The literature
on local monitoring addresses similar concerns with related approaches, either by
allowing some form of communication, or by constructing suitable strategies withmild
punishments. Further complications arise, however, with local monitoring as, upon
observing defections, players try to infer the spread of defection and the beliefs of other
players about future play.
All of the limiting results presented in this section apply to stage games with
local monitoring that are not separable, since a Folk Theorem would trivially obtain
otherwise. Most results are developed for stage games with local interaction and in
which the network structure is common knowledge.Thus for expositional ease, restrict
attention to such scenarios unless specified otherwise.
Ben-Porath and Kahneman’s () seminal contribution considers games with
public randomization and in which players can make public announcements about
the past behavior of other players whom they observed. The analysis characterizes
the minimal level of observability required to obtain efficient outcomes for arbitrary
stage games. The main result establishes that, when the discount factor tends to one,
the limit set of sequential equilibrium payoffs contains the set of individually rational
payoffs, whenever every player is observed by at least two other players. For arbitrary
stage game payoffs, two monitors are required to guarantee that inconsistent public
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francesco nava 111
announcements about past play can be sanctioned by the community. Results also
establish that if payoffs are assessed by the limit inferior of the average payoff (that is if
δ = ), every individually rational payoff is a sequential equilibrium payoff even when
players are monitored by only one other player.
Renault and Tomala () develop similar insights in a model with global interac-
tions, local monitoring, no discounting, and no explicit communication. Their main
finding establishes that a Nash Folk Theorem applies if and only if the monitoring
network is -connected (that is, if there are two independent paths connecting any two
players, or equivalently, if the subgraphs obtained by suppressing any one player are
still connected). The result abstracts from sequential rationality, which considerably
simplifies the problem as punishments need not be incentive compatible. Although
explicit communication is ruled out, the no discounting assumption and the restriction
to Nash equilibrium imply that players can use any finite number of future periods to
privately communicate with neighbors at no cost. Tomala () extends the analysis to
partially known networks, in which players only know their neighbors and the number
of players in the network, and derives a Nash FolkTheorem.
More recently, Laclau () considers a local interaction setup analogous to
Renault and Tomala (), while allowing for imperfect local monitoring and explicit
communication between neighbors (private local cheap talk). Monitoring is imperfect,
as players observe their payoff, but not the actions chosen in their neighborhood.
Her main contribution identifies necessary and sufficient conditions on the network
of interactions for a Nash Folk Theorem to hold when the payoff of every player is
responsive to unilateral deviations (in that players monitor unilateral deviations in
their neighborhood, despite local monitoring being imperfect). In a recent companion
paper, Laclau () extends conclusions to a model in which communication is global
(players can communicate with all opponents), and can be either private or public.
Contrary to Laclau (), where a Nash Folk Theorem is established, the analysis
here applies to sequential equilibria of the infinitely repeated game with imperfect local
monitoring. As before, payoffs are assumed to be sensitive to unilateral deviations. If so,
a sequentially rational FolkTheorem holds provided that a joint pairwise identifiability
condition regarding payoff functions is satisfied. The condition requires players to
detect the identity of the deviating player, whenever they detect a unilateral deviation
in their neighborhood. The analysis then shows that, when payoffs are sensitive to
unilateral deviations, a necessary and sufficient condition on the network topology for
the FolkTheorem to hold for all payoff functions is that no two players have the same set
of neighbors (not counting each other). The main contribution of both papers consists
in the analysis of imperfect local monitoring, which had been neglected by the earlier
literature.
Three related studies, Xue (), Cho (), and Cho (), analyze cooperation
in binary-symmetric Prisoners’ Dilemma games. Even though it is not difficult to
construct sequential equilibria supporting cooperation in these environments, the
classical modification of a trigger strategy devised in Ellison () to enforce a
cooperative equilibrium has an undesirable feature. Namely, it is not stable to mistakes
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112 repeated games and networks
in that defections spread over the network, and cooperation is never recovered
whenever an agent defects by mistake in the repeated game. The main aim of these
three studies, thus, consists of constructing equilibria that sustain cooperation and
revert to cooperation after any history of play.The classical solution to this complication
involves bounding the length of the punishment phase. That is, if an agent observes
his neighbor playing defection, then he punishes his neighbor by defecting for finitely
many periods. Local monitoring, however, may cause discrepancies in beliefs between
agents about a neighbor’s future actions (that is, the expected date at which a player
ends a defection phase may not be common knowledge in his neighborhood). If
there is such a discrepancy at some history, then an agent whose neighbors have
different beliefs may not be able to satisfy the expectations of all his neighbors in
any period which in turn may cause an infinite repetition of defection phases and,
thus, a failure of stability. Furthermore, bounded punishment strategies may not even
constitute a sequential equilibrium in a general networked setting. In order to prove
the existence of a cooperative and stable sequential equilibrium, such discrepancies
of beliefs may be resolved through some form of coordination in punishments. To
this end, Xue () restricts attention to line-shaped networks, and shows that in
such graphs cooperation is a stable equilibrium when players comply with specific
bounded punishment strategies. Cho () establishes a similar results for acyclical
networks by allowing agents to communicate locally with their neighbors. In contrast
to Laclau (), the focus is on sequential equilibria; while in contrast to Laclau
(), communication is only local, and not public, and therefore players cannot
easily coordinate their punishments. Both Xue () and Cho () exploit the
acyclicity of the network structure to simplify the inference problem associated with
contagion, as players expect punishments to dissipate at the periphery of the network.
Borrowing an idea from Ellison (), Cho () instead shows that a cooperative
and stable sequential equilibrium exists for any possible monitoring structure if players
have access to a public randomization device. If so, the inference problem is solved
through coordinating behavior rather than by restricting the class of network structures.
Nava and Piccione () study a broader class of binary-symmetric games which
satisfy the additional requirements (iv)–(vi) described in Section .. In contrast to
the earlier results, but similarly to Tomala (), the study allows for uncertainty
about the interaction network. In particular, to capture behavior in large markets the
analysis postulates that players are privately informed of their neighborhood. Their
main result establishes that, for sufficiently high discount rates and any prior beliefs
with full support about the network structure, sequential equilibria exist in which
efficient stage-game outcomes are played in every period. Standard results do not
apply in this framework because bilateral enforcementmay not be incentive compatible
when punishments in one relationship affect outcomes in all the others. For instance,
punishing a neighbor indefinitelywith a grim trigger strategy is not viable if cooperation
in other relationships is disrupted (see Figure .), and mild trigger strategies such
as in Ellison () work only for particular specifications of payoffs (e.g., Prisoners’
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figure 6.1 With trigger strategies, the central player prefers not to punish a single defection, as
it would destroy cooperation in all his remaining relationships.
Dilemma). Equilibrium strategies supporting efficient outcomes are built so that players
believe that cooperation will eventually resume, after any history of play.
The result is constructive, and exploits simple bounded-punishment strategies which
are robust with respect to the players’ priors about the monitoring structure. In
particular, in the equilibria characterized only local information matters to determine
players’ behavior. Efficiency is supported by strategies that respond to defections with
further defections. When the players’ discount rate is smaller than one, the main
difficulty in the construction of sequentially rational strategies that support efficiency
is the preservation of short-run incentive compatibility after particular histories of
play which involve several defections. When defections spread through a network,
two complications arise. The first occurs when a player expects future defection
coming from a particular direction. Suppose that somewhere in a cycle, for example,
a defection has occurred and reaches a player from one direction. If this player does
not respond, he may expect future defections from the opposite direction caused by
players who are themselves responding to the original defection (see Figure .). This
player’s short-term incentives then depend on the timing and on the number of future
defections that he expects. In such cases, the verification of sequential rationality
and the calculation of consistent beliefs can be extremely demanding. The analysis
circumvents this difficulty by constructing consistent beliefs, which imply that a player
never expects future defections to reach him (as unexpected behavior is always blamed
on a neighbors’ defection). Such beliefs are generated trivially when priors assign
positive probability only to acyclic monitoring structures. More importantly, such
beliefs can always be generated when priors have full support.The second complication
arises when a player has failed to respond to a large number of defections. On the one
hand, matching the number of defections of the opponent in the future may not be
incentive compatible, say when this player is currently achieving efficient payoffs with
a large number of different neighbors (as was the case with grim trigger strategies).
The restriction that a player’s action is common to all neighbors is of course the main
source of complications here. On the other hand, notmatching themmay give rise to the
circumstances outlined in the first type of complications, that is, this player may then
expect future defections from a different direction. The former hurdle is circumvented
by bounding the length of punishments, while the latter, as before, by constructing
appropriate consistent beliefs.
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figure 6.2 Cycling defections complicate incentives constraints, as beliefs about the timing of
future defections become the key force driving behavior.
Some of these difficulties do not arise when players are patient (that is, if δ = ) as
short-term incentives are irrelevant and punishments need not be bounded. Indeed,
stronger results hold for the case of limit discounting in which payoffs are evaluated
according to Banach-Mazur limit of the average payoff. If so, efficiency is resilient to
histories of defections. In particular, there exists a sequential equilibrium such that,
after any finite sequence of defections, paths eventually converge to the constant play
of efficient actions in all neighborhoods in every future period. An essential part of the
construction is that in any relationship in which defections have occurred the number
of periods inwhich inefficient actions are played is “balanced”: as the gameunfolds from
any history, both players will have played the inefficient action an equal number of times
before resuming the efficient play. Remarkably, such balanced retaliations eventually
extinguish themselves and always allow the resumption of cooperation throughout
the network. Although the analysis is restricted to homogeneous discount rates and
symmetric stage games with deterministic payoffs, the equilibria characterized are
robust with respect to heterogeneity in payoffs and discount rates, and with respect
to uncertainty in payoffs and population size, as long as the ordinal properties of the
stage games are maintained across the players. These equilibria also persist as babbling
equilibria in setups with communication. In addition, results extend to accommodate
monitoring structures in which players interact with fewer players than they observe.
6.4 Fixed Discounting andNetwork
Amplification
.............................................................................................................................................................................
Much of the literature on community enforcement (discussed in the introduction
and in Section .) focuses on the case of sufficiently high discount factors and does
not characterize efficient equilibria at fixed discount factors. A major concern in
these papers was ensuring that players did not cooperate off the equilibrium path.
The literature on repeated networked games with fixed discount factors abstracts
from such a concern by analyzing the most cooperative equilibrium in games with
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continuous action sets. Such equilibria make players indifferent between cooperating
and defecting on-path (as otherwise a player could be asked to cooperate more). By
essentially the same argument as in Ellison (), this implies that players weakly
prefer to defect off-path. Hence, a contribution of this literature is to show that grim
trigger strategies provide the strongest possible incentives for cooperation on-path,
not that they provide incentives for punishing off-path. The characterization of the
most cooperative equilibrium has implications for the efficiency and stability of various
network configurations which are the main objectives of this literature.
This approach was pioneered by several papers in public economics analyzing the
effect of the size and structure of a group on the maximum equilibrium level of public
good provision. Classical references, however, characterizemaximum cooperation only
for complete networks and public monitoring, and find few unambiguous relationships
between group structure andmaximumcooperation. Pecorino () shows that public
good provision is easier in large groups because a deviation causing everyone else to
defect is more costly in large groups. Haag and Lagunoff () consider a broader
class of public goods games in a similar setup and characterizes the maximal average
level of cooperation (MAC) over all stationary subgame perfect equilibrium paths.
The MAC is shown to be increasing in monotone shifts of, and decreasing in mean
preserving spreads of the distribution of discount factors. The latter suggests that
more heterogeneous groups are less cooperative on average. Furthermore, in a class of
Prisoners’ Dilemma games, the MAC exhibits increasing returns to scale for a range of
heterogeneous discount factors.That is, larger groups aremore cooperative, on average,
than smaller ones. By contrast, when the group has a commondiscount factor, theMAC
is invariant to group size.
Haag and Lagunoff () relax the public monitoring assumption and examine
optimal network structure in a binary-symmetric Prisoners’ Dilemma with local
interactions and local monitoring, in which each individual’s discount factor is
randomly determined. A planner chooses a local interaction network before the
discount factors are realized in order to maximize utilitarian welfare. A local trigger
strategy equilibrium (LTSE) describes a sequential equilibrium in which each individ-
ual conditions his cooperation on the cooperation of at least a subset of neighbors.
The main results restrict attention to the LTSE associated to the highest utilitarian
welfare, and demonstrate a trade-off in the design problem between suboptimal
punishments and social conflict. Potentially suboptimal punishments arise in designs
with local interactions sincemonitoring is local. Owing to the heterogeneity of discount
factors, however, greater social conflict may arise in more connected networks. When
individuals’ discount factors are known to the planner, the optimal network exhibits
a cooperative core and an uncooperative fringe. Uncooperative players are impatient,
and are connected to cooperative ones who are patient and tolerate their free riding so
that social conflict is kept to a minimum. By contrast, when the planner knows only the
ex-ante distribution over individual discount factors, in some cases the optimal design
partitions individuals into isolated cliques, whereas in other cases incomplete graphs
with small overlap are possible.
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Two recent and related studies have addressed similar questions in the context of
continuous action games with local monitoring, namely Wolitzky () and Ali and
Miller (). Both models feature smooth actions and payoffs so that, with grim
trigger strategies, binding on-path incentive constraints imply slack off-path incentive
constraints. Wolitzky () studies cooperation in repeated networked games with a
fixed and common discount factor.The setup displays local monitoring, while allowing
for global interaction, and generalizes environments analyzed in Kandori () and
Ellison (). In particular, the analysis considers public goods gameswith continuous
actions in which players choose of a level of cooperation (in that higher actions are
privately costly but benefit everyone). Payoffs are separable, but depend on the action
chosen by every other player in the game. In every period, a monitoring network is
realized and players receive signals about the global structure of the realized network.
Players perfectly observe the actions of their realized neighborhood, but observe
nothing about any other player’s action. A distinguishing feature of the environment
analyzed is that in every period the monitoring network must be observed by players
after actions are chosen.The assumption is substantial in the equilibrium construction,
and results do not generally apply to alternative specifications in which uncertainty
about the realized monitoring persists over time.
The study characterizes the maximum level of cooperation that can be robustly sus-
tained in Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (in that it can be sustained for any information
that players may have about the realizedmonitoring network).The robustness criterion
captures the perspective of an outside observer, who knows what information players
have about each other’s actions, but not what information players have about each
other’s information about actions, and who must make predictions that are robust
to higher-order information. Determining the maximum level of cooperation for any
specification of players’ higher-order information appears intractable, as the strategies
sustaining the maximum level of cooperation could in principle depend on players’
private information in complicated ways. However, the main theoretical contribution
establishes that the robust maximum level of cooperation is always sustained by simple
grim trigger strategies, where each player cooperates at a fixed level unless he ever
observes another player failing to cooperate at his prescribed level, in which case he
stops cooperating forever. Grim trigger strategies also maximize cooperation when
players have perfect knowledge of who observed whom in the past (as is the case when
the monitoring network is fixed over time). Interestingly, it is when players have less
information about the monitoring structure that more complicated strategies can do
better than grim trigger. This is the case because the actions of different players are
strategic complements when players knowwho observedwhom in the past, as defecting
makes every on-path history less likely when monitoring is local and strategies are
 The key role of the assumption is to ensure that stage game actions are one-dimensional (so that
players simply choose a level of cooperation, rather than a map from the realized monitoring network to
a level of cooperation).
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grim triggers. The strategic complementarity breaks down, however, when players can
disagree about who has observed whom.
The analysis then compares different economies in terms of the maximal level of
cooperation that can be achieved. Results are developed for two special cases: equal
monitoring (when in expectation all players are monitored equally well); and fixed
monitoring network (when the monitoring network is fixed over time). With equal
monitoring, the effectiveness of a monitoring technology in supporting cooperation
is completely determined by one simple statistic, its effective contagiousness, which
captures the cumulative expected present discounted number of players who learn
about a deviation. Naturally, higher levels of cooperation can be sustained if news about
a deviation spreads throughout the networkmore quickly. Cooperation in the provision
of pure public goods (when themarginal benefit of cooperating is independent of group
size) is increasing in group size if the expected number of players who learn about a
deviation is increasing in group size, while cooperation in the provision of divisible
public goods (when the marginal benefit of cooperating is inversely proportional to
group size) is increasing in group size if the expected fraction of players who learn about
a deviation is increasing in group size. Hence, cooperation in the provision of pure
public goods tends to be greater in larger groups, while cooperation in the provision
of divisible public goods tends to be greater in smaller groups. In addition, there is a
sense in which making monitoring more uncertain reduces cooperation. With a fixed
monitoring network, instead, a novel notion of network centrality determines both
which players cooperate more in a given network and which networks support more
cooperation overall, thus linking the graph-theoretic property of centrality with the
game-theoretic property of robustmaximum cooperation. For example, adding links to
themonitoring network necessarily increases all players’ robustmaximumcooperation,
which formalizes the idea that individuals in better-connected groups cooperate more.
Ali and Miller () analyze community enforcement in a pairwise interaction
game in which the network is common knowledge.Their analysis compares interaction
networks in terms of maximal level of cooperation in variable-stakes Prisoners’
Dilemmas. Results establish that cliques are optimal network structures when players’
equilibrium path behavior is stationary. Results are developed in the context of a
continuous time model in which all players discount the future at a common fixed rate.
Every link of the network is governed by an independent Poisson recognition process
with a common recognition rate. Whenever a link is recognized, an instantaneous
two-period interaction is played within the selected relationship. In the first subperiod,
both players propose stakes at which they intend to interact, and the smallest of the two
proposals determines the actual stakes in the relationship. In the second subperiod,
players engage in a Prisoners’ Dilemma. If both cooperate, each receives a payoff which
coincides with the agreed stakes; if both defect, each receives a payoff equal to zero;
whereas when one defects while the other cooperates, the cooperating player incurs a
 Actions are strategic complements if a player is willing to cooperate more at any on-path history
whenever another player cooperates more at any on-path history.
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cooperation-loss which may depend on the agreed stakes, while the defecting player
receives a deviation-gain which may also depend on the agreed stakes. The stage
game is said to satisfy strategic complementarity whenever stakes exceed the difference
between deviation gains and cooperation losses. Monitoring is local. Thus, players
ignore both the actions chosen in interactions to which they did not belong and the
time at which these interactions took place.The analysis restricts attention to stationary
strategies in which behavior is independent of the history of play at any equilibrium
path. A stationary equilibrium in which players always cooperate for any possible
equilibrium-path history is said to be a mutual effort equilibrium. Any stationary
grim trigger strategy profile that prescribes stakes such that incentive constraints bind
at every equilibrium path history is therefore a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium by the
arguments above.
The main result establishes that any symmetric network with degree d possesses a
symmetric contagion equilibrium that Pareto dominates every distinct mutual effort
equilibrium (and thus identifies the optimal stakes). The result also implies that no
other stationary equilibrium has a higher value if the stage game satisfies strategic
complementarity. The argument relies on a measure of network viscosity (which
is minimal in the clique) that captures the incentives to comply with equilibrium
strategies. This measure differs from the effective contagiousness in Wolitzky ()
because in public goods games every player may punish a deviator upon receiving
news of a defection, whereas in separable games only neighbors can effectively punish
a deviation.
Results exploit the characterization of the optimal stakes to analyze how network
structure affects aggregate welfare. Adding links has two roles in the model: it helps
information diffusion through contagion; and it increases the number of interactions
(as links are recognized at the same rate) and consequently the expected surplus when
cooperating. The main welfare implication of the model is the optimality of cliques. In
particular, for any network in which the maximal degree is no more than d, no player
attains a mutual effort equilibrium payoff that exceeds his optimal equilibrium payoff
in the symmetric network of degree d. Moreover, if the stage game satisfies strategic
complementarity, then the value in every equilibrium is less than the optimal value in
the symmetric network of degree d.
 The deviation-gain is assumed: to exceed stakes; to be zero when stakes are equal to zero; to be
strictly increasing and strictly convex in stakes; to have a first derivative that is greater than  at zero and
diverging to infinity as stakes diverge. The cooperation-loss is also assumed to be zero when stakes are
equal to zero.
 When strategic complementarity holds, mutual cooperation is efficient in the stage game. But the
assumption is stronger. Even with two players, efficiency of mutual cooperation does not ensure that
optimal equilibria are mutual effort, which is why the stronger assumption is invoked.
 A permutation of the players π : N → N is a graph automorphism if ij ∈ G implies π(i)π(j) ∈ G.
A network G is symmetric if for any two links ij,kl ∈ G there exists a graph automorphism π such that
π(i) = k and π(j) = l. In a symmetric network, all links are isomorphic to each other.
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Results also extend such logic to a model in which players incur an additively
separable cost of forming links which depends only on the number of neighbors
they have. Costs are said to be concave if the average link cost weakly decreases
with the number of links; while costs are convex otherwise. When costs are concave,
there exists a symmetric Perfect Bayesian equilibrium on the complete network that
yields to each player a payoff that is higher than his payoff in any mutual effort
equilibrium of any other incomplete network. Moreover, when the game satisfies
strategic complementarity, the claim holds for every equilibrium (not just for mutual
effort equilibria). When costs are convex, the welfare maximizing network may no
longer be the complete network, and the analysis applies only to regular networks. In
such cases it is possible to find the clique size that maximizes the payoff of a player in
the welfaremaximizing equilibrium, and the associated optimal value. Nomutual effort
equilibrium on any regular network attains payoffs that exceed such value. Moreover,
if the stage game satisfies strategic complementarity, no equilibrium on any regular
network attains a higher value.
All the papers discussed provide novel and interesting insights linking interaction
and monitoring networks to measures of aggregate welfare. These observations can in
principle explain why community enforcementmay lead to substantially different levels
of cooperation across societies. The main limitation of these studies, however, is the
restrictive class of games to which results apply, as results are generally developed for
Prisoners’ Dilemma type stage games possessing a mutual minmax Nash equilibrium.
Generalizing techniques to arbitrary stage game does not seem straightforward, as the
characterization of the equilibrium with the highest utilitarian welfare may become
intractable.
6.5 Fixed Discounting and
Communication
.............................................................................................................................................................................
A separate strand of the literature analyzes how equilibrium outcomes are affected by
the availability of different communication technologies. These studies include Lippert
and Spagolo (), Wolitzky (), and Ali and Miller ().
Lippert and Spagnolo () consider environments with local interaction and
separable stage games. In particular, they focus on stage games in which every pair of
players plays an asymmetric Prisoners’ Dilemma in which the interaction network may
be direct, but is necessarily common knowledge. In this setup, they first consider two
benchmark cases: publicmonitoring (when each agent observes the full history of play);
and local monitoring. The main focus, however, is a variant of the local monitoring
model in which players have access to a fixed number of rounds of private cheap talk in
every period of the game. The communication network coincides with the interaction
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network (as was implicitly the case in Renault and Tomala ; Cho ; and Laclau
).
With cheap talk, the possibility of transmitting soft information about privately
observed defections to other agentsmay foster cooperation in gameswith fixeddiscount
factors. Grim trigger strategies, which are optimal (in the sense of Abreu ) under
public monitoring and which correspond to the contagion strategies studied in random
matching games, are no longer optimal when information transmission is endogenous
and players account for their incentives to communicate truthfully. When cooperation
in the network is disciplined by such strategies, cheap talk is never used in equilibrium,
as an agent reverts to non-cooperative play forever after observing a defection. This
triggers a contagious process that eliminates all prospects of future cooperation in the
network, thereby removing any motive for truthful communication. When forgiving
strategies are used, instead, agents do have incentives to transmit information truthfully
to avoid the collapse of cooperation as upon observing a defection, non-defecting
agents continue cooperating and spread information on the deviation until only the
initial deviator can be punished by a neighbor who benefits from such punishment. As
information transmission within the network speeds up punishment phases, forgiving
equilibria strictly dominate contagious equilibria.
Another central finding of the analysis is that with asymmetric stage-games,
interaction networks display a rather general end-network effect that occurs under
any informational assumption. Network structures such as trees may not sustain
cooperative behavior, as agents with only outgoing links cannot be sanctioned if they
defect. This end-network effect is a special case of gatekeeping and characterizes
those gatekeepers as key players to cooperation in the network. Circular networks
overcome this problem, ensuring that all defections can be met with punishment
and that networks of relations are sustainable in equilibrium. The results provide an
intuitive explanation for the importance of “closure” and “density.” When monitoring
is local and agents play according to grim trigger strategies, the enforceability of
cooperation in bilateral relationships may hinder global cooperation in the larger
networks, as a pair may not be willing to sacrifice their bilateral relationship to be
part of the multilateral punishment mechanismwhich could sustain cooperation in the
larger network. This argument extends from bilateral relations to larger subnetworks
and establishes why coalitional agreements may undermine global cooperation ones
by softening third-party punishments. This problem, however, can be overcome by
forgiving strategies.
Wolitzky () analyzes games with fixed discounting under different communica-
tion protocols. Hismain contribution establishes a direct relationship between different
communication technologies and the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs. Results
apply to separable stage games with local interaction, in which monitoring is local and
imperfect, and in which the interaction network is common knowledge. In particular,
the actions chosen by the two players in a relationship determine a signal realization
pinning down payoffs in that relationship. Signals are random variables that depend
only on the actions chosen by the two players on a link (and are thus independent
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across relationships). Signals are locally public, but local monitoring is imperfect, as
players observe only their action and the signal realizations in the interactions to which
they belonged (but not necessarily the actions of their opponents). As the stage game
is separable, the study aims at characterizing the community enforcement for a given
discount factor. Results apply to stage games which possess a mutual minmax Nash
equilibrium in every realized interaction.
The analysis first establishes that different communication protocols replicate any
sequential equilibrium of a corresponding game with public information. The public
information benchmark analyzed here is one in which all players observe the signal
realizations on every link (but not necessarily the actions chosen by players other than
themselves). In every period of the game, communication is modelled as an infinite
number of rounds in which messages can be sent. Three communication technologies
are considered: public cheap talk, private cheap talk, and tokens. The first result
extends contributions in Ben-Porath and Kahneman (), and establishes that any
equilibrium payoff of the game with public monitoring is also an equilibrium payoff of
a corresponding game with local monitoring and public cheap talk. The second result
builds on the contribution by Renault and Tomala (), and considers environments
in which cheap talk is private and constrained to take place only on the interaction
network (that is, when the interaction and communication networks coincide). The
result establishes that any public monitoring equilibrium payoff is also an equilibrium
payoff of a game with local monitoring and private cheap talk if and only if the network
is -connected. The main departures from Renault and Tomala () are: (a) that
-connectedness is not only sufficient, but also necessary (in that for any network that
is not -connected there exists a game in which private cheap talk cannot replicate
publicmonitoring); and (b) that -connectedness is sufficient for replication evenwhen
the frequency of interaction is low. A final replication result considers environments
with private cheap talk in which tokens can be exchanged in every relationship at
each communication round. The main difference between cheap talk and tokens is
that players must own tokens before transferring them. Results establish that public
monitoring outcomes can always be replicated as sequential equilibria with tokens.
Although the equilibrium construction relies both on tokens and private cheap talk, the
same conclusions would hold if cheap talk were ruled out, since infinitesimal amounts
of valueless tokens could be used to communicate. Message spaces and monetary
endowments need not to be tailored to the specific game provided that a spanning tree
exists in which all non-leaf players have a positive token endowment.
The final contribution presents sufficient conditions for tokens to expand the set of
equilibrium payoffs compared both to games without communication, and to games
with private cheap talk. Sufficient conditions require: (a) the network to possess a
subtree; (b) every game played by two linked players to have a product structure; (c)
the set of public information equilibria to include the convex hull of the locally public
equilibria of the game with private information. These conditions simplify in many
common environments, and only require the existence of a small subtree in which a
strategy with tokens expands the equilibrium set.The essentiality of tokens then follows
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since tokens expand the equilibrium payoff hull in the entire game when they do so in a
subtree (as the remaining players can always comply with a strategy with private cheap
talk in which tokens play no role).
The analysis of tokens builds on and is closely related to the literature on microfoun-
dations ofmoney. One of themost important themes in that literature asks when letting
individuals exchange inherently valueless tokens can expand the equilibriumpayoff sets
in dynamic decentralized economies; for instance, Kocherlakota (, ). Results
here carry out a similar exercise in the context of a more general setting.
Ali and Miller () analyze the same environments discussed in their  paper
(in Section .) while allowing for pre-play communication. In particular, before
selecting stakes, partners may communicate to their neighbors information about
the behavior of other players. The analysis studies both evidentiary communication
(when players can conceal information, but cannot falsify it), and cheap talk. The
analysis focuses on ostracism strategies in which players target punishments toward
defecting players while cooperating with those they believe to be cooperative. To
understand the impact of strategic communication, the analysis first characterizes two
classical benchmarks. The first is bilateral enforcement, which identifies equilibria
that abstract from community enforcement or communication (which in this setup
amounts to bilateral grim trigger strategies played independently in each relationship).
The second benchmark is mechanical communication, which characterizes settings
in which players are constrained to reveal all their information truthfully. Permanent
ostracism is an equilibrium with mechanical communication, since defectors must
reveal themselves as such in all their future interactions. As permanent ostracism
employs the harshest feasible punishment against defectors, it supports at least as
much cooperation as any other equilibrium, and it coincides with the most cooperative
equilibrium of a model with public monitoring.
When communication is strategic, one may conjecture that, while defecting players
have a strong incentive to conceal their own misdeeds, cooperating players should
have aligned interests in revealing and punishing the guilty. Themain result establishes
that this intuition is wrong. If defecting players are permanently ostracized, then their
victims have a strong incentive to conceal such defections and to defect on other
cooperating players. This strategic motive implies that permanent ostracism cannot be
optimal with strategic communication and that the players are no better off than under
bilateral enforcement. In other words, truthful communication is incentive compatible
with permanent ostracism only if community enforcement is redundant. This stark
negative conclusion applies to every network, evenwhen communication is evidentiary.
In fact, consider a permanent ostracism equilibrium and a relationship between two
neighbors. Suppose by contradiction that they cooperate at stakes that would not be
attainable under bilateral enforcement. Each player’s incentives to cooperate must then
be driven by the threat of punishments from others. Now consider a history at which
one of them knows that everyone, except the two of them, has defected and should
be ostracized. Because all the other players are defecting, this player’s only incentive
to cooperate arises from his continuation play with the one cooperative neighbor he
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has left, just as under bilateral enforcement. Thus, he must strictly prefer to conceal his
information and to defect at the equilibrium stakes, rather than telling the truth and
reducing their stakes to keep on cooperating.
This result is most pronounced in Prisoners’ Dilemmas, but analogues apply to
general separable stage games. In any symmetric permanent ostracism equilibrium,
each player’s equilibrium payoff in a relationship is bounded above by the highest payoff
attainable in a bilateral enforcement equilibrium in that relationship. Asymmetric
permanent ostracism equilibria allow for more flexibility, but a bound on payoffs,
arising from bilateral enforcement equilibria, still applies regardless of the network
structure. Thus, the incentives to conceal information generally constrain the surplus
that can be attained through permanent ostracism.
The negative theoretical conclusion on permanent ostracism contrasts with the
prevalence of ostracism in communities and markets. Observed community enforce-
ment norms, however, often involve forgiveness, in that players are only ostracized tem-
porarily. The analysis provides a rationale for such norms by showing how forgiveness
may encourage truthful communication between cooperative victims. In particular,
when ostracism is temporary and players are forgiven at random times, innocent
players communicate truthfully and cooperate with each other at levels beyond those
attainable under bilateral enforcement (if players are sufficiently patient or society is
sufficiently large). Temporary punishmentsmay thus facilitate community enforcement
by maintaining social collateral that fosters communication and cooperation among
non-defecting players in the wake of defections.
The results on communication and ostracism should be contrasted with community
enforcement schemes without information transmission, such as contagion equilibria
introduced for anonymous random matching environments by Kandori () and
Ellison (), and applied to social networks by Wolitzky (), Ali and Miller
(), and others. Contagion offers a useful benchmark for attainable payoffs in
the absence of institutions or communication, but it also represents a fragile form of
collective reputation, in that a single defection destroys a player’s trust in the entire
community. Ostracism, by contrast, reflects the principle that players ought to trust
those partners who have never defected to their knowledge, while punishing those
who have done so. Thus, with ostracism, reputations are entirely at the individual level.
Hybrid community enforcement norms can be envisioned in which cooperative players
communicate truthfully to other cooperators while ostracizing those who have defected
in the past so long as they know of no more than d defecting players, and defect on
all their partners otherwise. Such equilibria improve upon permanent ostracism, but
average stakes are bounded by contagion with n− d players.
Results in Ali and Miller () rely on several modeling assumptions and inno-
vations. Players interact at random privately observed times, which contrasts with
classical repeated games in which all players are known to have interacted in every
period.This generates non-trivial incentives at the communication stage, as playersmay
now conceal an interaction from their partners. Incentives would differ if the timing
of interactions were public. Unraveling would compel a player to reveal all details of

“-Bramoulle-c” — // — : — page  — 






124 repeated games and networks
his past interactions, since a partner could rationally consider his failure to disclose
as evidence of a deviation. If so, strategic communication would be as effective as
permanent ostracism with mechanical communication. However, equilibria would be
fragile, and even the slightest chance of interactions happening at privately observed
times would again undermine any incentive for truthful communication.
The variable stakes model allows for a tight comparison of equilibria at a fixed
discount rate and offers more scope for cooperation. Prisoners’ Dilemma games with
fixed stakes partly obscure incentives to ostracize by limiting the extent to which players
can tailor their actions to the environment. In fact, if the stakes in each relationshipwere
fixed, permanent ostracism would do no better than bilateral enforcement (as players,
who are unwilling to cooperate under bilateral enforcement, would be unwilling to
cooperate when only two cooperating players remain). In contrast, variable stakes
enable partners to adjust the terms of their relationship based on their mutual history
(for instance, by reducing their stakes once some players have been ostracized), shifting
focus from technological constraints to the incentives for truthful communication.
6.6 Comments: Applications and
Omissions
.............................................................................................................................................................................
Applications:The use of implicit social sanctions to deter misconduct has been widely
documented in economics (Milgrom, North, andWeingast ; Greif ), political
science (Ostrom ; Fearon and Laitin ), sociology (Coleman ; Raub
and Weesie ), and law (Bernstein ). Some of these studies have stressed
the importance of community cohesion for attaining socially desirable outcomes in
trust-based transactions, for example, Coleman (), Greif (), McMillan (),
Fearon and Laitin (), Uzzi (), Dixit (). Coleman seminal’s contribution
identifies a notion of social capital, and relates such notion to the underlying social
architecture. In Coleman’s findings, the enforcement of cooperation is more effective
in networks with high closure and cohesion, as cohesion facilitates the implementation
of social sanctions, thereby increasing welfare. Other studies highlight the importance
of information dissemination within the community for the effectiveness of such
community-based sanctions. Greif () finds that contract enforcement between
medieval Maghribi traders is effective only when a close-knit community disseminates
information so to align its members’ incentives to comply with the community-based
sanctions against deviant behavior.
Coleman’s notion of social capital has motivated many of the more applied the-
oretical contributions in this field. For instance, Vega-Redondo () considers a
novel approach to network formation in the context of a repeated binary-symmetric
Prisoners’ Dilemma with random payoffs. The social network specifies not only the
local interaction structure, but also the diffusion of information about past play, and
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the availability of new cooperation opportunities. Search plays an important role in
this environment, as agents always look for new partners when relationship-specific
payoffs are volatile. In this context, the analysis develops a notion of social capital and
shows how the social network adapts to changes in the environment. Network effects are
important in enhancing cooperation; and the social network endogenously adapts by
displaying more cohesiveness whenever the environment deteriorates. Conclusions are
obtained by numerical simulations and supported by approximate mean-field analysis.
More recently, Balmaceda and Escobar () build on results from Haag and
Lagunoff (, ), discussed in Section ., to show that cohesive communities
(in which players are partitioned into isolated cliques) emerge as welfare-maximizing
network structures. Cohesive communities generate local common knowledge, which
allows players to coordinate their punishments, and, as a result, yield high equilibrium
payoffs. Results provide an additional theoretical rationale for Coleman’s link between
cohesion and social capital, but apply only to environments in which monitoring
is local, while interactions are centralized (in that all community members interact
with a single player who knows the full history of play). The analysis also establishes
that optimal networks are minimally connected, when players monitor every other
community member in their component of the social network. If so, as in Burt
(, ), bridging structural holes in the monitoring network becomes the sole
consideration identifying the optimal social network (as cohesion within a component
is imposed by assumption).
Other recent studies have theoretically analyzed and empirically documented the
impact of network structure on different kinds of cooperation, such as favor exchange
(Möbius ; Hauser and Hopenhayn ; Karlan et al. ; Jackson,
Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan ) and risk-sharing (Ambrus, Möbius, and Szeidl
; Bramoullé and Kranton ; Bloch, Genicot, and Ray ). These studies are
survey and discussed in Chapter  of this handbook. Although much empirical work
remains to be done, empirical findings hint at different measures of centrality as deter-
minants of cooperation within social interactions. For example, Karlan et al. ()
find that indirect network connections between individuals in Peruvian shantytowns
support lending and borrowing, consistent with findings showing that more central
players cooperate more. More subtly, Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan ()
find that favor-exchange networks in rural India exhibit high support (the property
that linked players share at least one common neighbor).
EndogenizingNetworks:General results on network formation are discussed in several
chapters of this handbook (Chapters –). Most studies on repeated interactions have
focused on optimal network design, rather than network formation, as in a repeated
setup many well-documented network formation games generate large multiplicity
of equilibrium networks (often including efficient networks). To see this, consider a
pairwise linking process in which players simultaneously propose the partnerships
they wish to engage in, and in which a partnership forms if and only if both players
propose it. Consider a Prisoners’ Dilemma game, in which the formed network is
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common knowledge. It is straightforward to see that any network G can arise in an
equilibrium of this game if it yields an individually rational net-payoff to each player,
via the following strategy profile: if networkG arises, then players follow the prescribed
equilibrium, but if any other network forms then each player perpetually defects. This
simple punishment deters players from deviating in the network formation stage. A
similar logic applies tomore complex games in which the networkmay not be common
knowledge since any link remains local common knowledge among the two neighbors.
SeparatingMonitoring from Interaction:Most studies analyze environments in which
the monitoring network and the network of interactions coincide (as was the case
in the baseline setup presented in Section .). However, conclusions generally carry
over to the case in which players monitor more individuals than they interact with (as
payoffs in any interaction can always be set to zero). Models with local monitoring and
global interaction have only been analyzed in a limited number of studies which include
Renault and Tomala (), Laclau (), and Wolitzky ().
Omissions: Some notable contributions to the literature have been omitted from the
main discussion to streamline exposition. Ahn () and Ahn and Souminen ()
are precursors to several subsequent, but more general, contributions. They analyze
cooperation in the context of binary-symmetric seller-buyer games with local moni-
toring and cheap talk, and present somewhat strong conditions for efficient outcomes
to obtain. Kinateder () considers a particular Prisoners’ Dilemma game with
global interaction, local monitoring, and in which players can truthfully communicate
information to neighbors over time. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although
the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced for
discount factors strictly below . If players are allowed to communicate strategically,
truthful communication arises endogenously only under additional assumptions. An
additional implication of his analysis is that, when the discount factor is below , the
viability of cooperation depends on the network’s diameter, but not on its clustering
coefficient. Mihm, Toth, and Lang () consider strategic interaction in separable
stage games with local monitoring. Their main contributions establish why strategic
interdependencies between relationships on a networkmay facilitate efficient outcomes,
and derive necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize the efficient equilibria of
the network game in terms of the architecture of the underlying network.
Large Bipartite Networks: More recently, two studies have considered a novel and
interesting approach to analyzing repeated networked games with a large number
of players, namely Fainmesser and Goldberg (), and Fainmesser (). Fain-
messer and Goldberg () analyze repeated games in large bipartite networks with
local monitoring and incomplete information about the network structure (players
are informed of their neighbors and of several additional characteristics about the
underlying graph). The model characterizes networks in which each agent cooperates
in some equilibriumwith every client to whomhe is connected. To this end, the analysis
establishes that in the proposed game: (a) the incentives of an agent to cooperate
depend only on her beliefs with respect to her local neighborhood (a subnetwork
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whose size is independent of the size of the entire network); and (b) when an agent
observes the network structure only partially, his incentives to cooperate can be
calculated as if the network was a random tree with him at its root.The characterization
sheds light on the welfare costs of relying only on repeated interactions for sustaining
cooperation, and on how to mitigate such costs. Fainmesser () builds on this
analysis by considering buyer-seller games in large bipartite networks, in which sellers
have the option to cheat their buyers, and buyers decide whether to repurchase from
different sellers. While endowing sellers with incomplete knowledge of the network,
the analysis derives conditions that determine whether a network is consistent with
cooperation between every buyer and seller that are connected.Three network features
reduce the minimal discount factor sufficient for cooperation: moderate and balanced
competition, sparseness, and segregation.
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